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Abstract 
This paper investigates the gains from the use of information technology in 
Australia during the 1990s using a growth accounting framework. We make use of 
new industry-level estimates of the productive capital stock. Our analysis suggests 
that Australia has done well out of the ￿new economy￿. Its use of computer 
technology is amongst the highest in the world with Australian business 
investment in computer and related equipment growing rapidly since the early 
1990s. Computer use has not been uniform throughout the economy but 
concentrated in more service-oriented sectors such as telecommunications, and 
finance and insurance. Additionally, we find that around one-half of the gains from 
the use of information technology can be attributed to price falls while the other 
half can be attributed to higher nominal expenditure. We arrive at the conclusion 
that Australia has experienced significant output growth related to computer use 
and has benefited from the technological advances in the sector through lower 
prices passed on to users. Thus, we conclude that there are substantial benefits to 
be gained from being a net user of computers as well as the more commonly 
mentioned benefits from being a producer. 
JEL Classification Numbers: D24, E22, O30, O33, O47 
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AUSTRALIAN USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
ITS CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH 
John Simon and Sharon Wardrop 
 
You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics 
￿ Robert Solow 
There are lies, damn lies and statistics 
￿ Popular aphorism 
1. Introduction 
During the stock market volatility of 1999 and 2000 much was made of whether 
certain economies were ￿new economy￿ or ￿old economy￿. ￿New economy￿ 
countries were those that had a significant high-tech production sector, ￿old 
economy￿ countries were the rest. In the hype surrounding the ￿new economy￿ 
stock returns for high-tech firms soared.1 Consequently, the stock markets of ￿new 
economy￿ countries soared while ￿old economy￿ stock markets delivered more 
pedestrian returns. It was generally assumed that stock market returns reflected the 
productivity of the broader economy and that high-tech production was delivering 
big productivity gains to certain countries while ￿old economy￿ countries were 
largely being left behind. As the events since April 2000 demonstrate, however, 
equating stock market performance with real economy performance can be 
dangerous in the presence of an asset price bubble.  
Australia, as an economy that was unequivocally dubbed ￿old economy￿, makes an 
interesting case study. Australia does not have many specifically high-technology 
firms. Furthermore, Australian manufacturing of high-tech products is limited. 
Notwithstanding this, Australia is amongst the world￿s heaviest users of high-tech 
                                           
1  Indeed, investors were so discerning that any company with a ￿dot com￿ in its name did well. 




products. The use of new consumer electronic devices, most notably mobile 
phones, is high by world standards. The following two figures highlight these 
aspects of high technology in Australia. Figure 1 illustrates the imbalance between 
production and consumption, while Figure 2 compares Australian use of IT with 
the rest of the world. 
Figure 1: Net Exports of Information Technology in 1997 




























































































































































Notes:   Data collected by International Data Corporation and provided to the authors via the OECD. Similar data 
have been published in the 1998 World Information Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA) report 




Figure 2: Information Technology Expenditure in 1997 
























Note:  As for Figure 1 
The imbalance shown in Figure 1 has been a source of concern. If manufacturers 
and inventors of high-tech products capture much of the benefit from their 
products then Australia is largely missing out on the high-tech revolution. On the 
other hand, if users of high-technology goods capture much of the benefit, there are 
grounds for optimism. Australia, as one of the strongest adopters of IT, could also 
be one of the greatest beneficiaries from the high-tech revolution. 
The view that users are large beneficiaries of the IT revolution has not enjoyed 
much currency. Nonetheless, a recent OECD report (OECD 2001) concluded that 




to focus on policies to foster its use, rather than its production￿ ￿ and it identified 
Australia as a country that had done exactly that. 
In the hype surrounding the ￿new economy￿ the distinction between simple 
production of a good and innovation was largely ignored. Production without 
associated gains in innovation, research and development has limited benefit. 
However, just as production may lead to greater innovation, so use of high 
technology may spur innovation. The difference is that the benefits to producers 
are likely to accrue within the industry while users may be more widely spread. 
This paper looks at the historical gains from the use of information technology in 
Australia. Our analysis suggests that Australia has done well out of the ￿new 
economy￿. However, while Australia has high overall use of computer technology, 
this is not evenly spread across industrial sectors. Figure 3 shows nominal 
investment as a percentage of gross value added (GVA) by sector for the financial 
years 1989/90 and 1999/2000. 
This dispersion reveals some interesting patterns. Traditional primary and 
secondary industries are not heavy direct users of information technology; instead 
service-based sectors have been the strongest adopters. Thus, the gains from 
information technology may not have been evenly distributed through the 
economy. We return to this issue when we discuss the industry results below. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
the previous literature before Section 3 discusses the relevant theory and some 
issues with the analysis. Section 4 discusses the data and other practical issues 
before Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 considers two interesting questions. 
The first, ￿What is the counterfactual?￿ considers what would have happened if the 
computer industry had not been characterised by the rapid price falls that epitomise 
the industry. The second looks at whether there are any detectable spillovers from 
the use of IT to multifactor productivity (MFP) growth. Section 7 discusses the 





Figure 3: Investment to Output Ratios by Sector 

























































































































































 1989/90   1999/2000
 
2. Previous  Research 
Although there have been a number of active contributors to the literature in the 
US there have been comparatively few studies based on experiences in other 
countries. For the most part this reflects data availability; the US is one of only a 
few countries with sufficient data to perform the growth accounting exercises 
required by this type of project.2 
Within the US, Oliner and Sichel (1994, 2000) have been prominent contributors 
to the literature. They find that the contribution of the use of information 
technology, i.e., computer hardware, software and communication equipment, to 
                                           




productivity growth grew rapidly in the second half of the 1990s. They also find 
that technological advances in the production of computer-related goods have 
contributed to the higher productivity growth rates witnessed in the second half of 
the decade. More specifically, they estimate that the use of information technology 
related goods (contributing 0.5 per cent) and the advances in the production of 
computers (contributing 0.25 per cent) accounted for around three-quarters of the  
1 per cent increase in labour productivity growth between the first and second 
halves of the 1990s in the US. 
Gordon (1999) reaches a very different conclusion. He argues that the production 
of computer hardware accounts for the entire increase in trend labour productivity 
between the first and second halves of the 1990s. This implies that the use  
of computers contributed nothing to the growth in trend productivity. Of the   
1 per cent increase in measured labour productivity throughout the decade he 
attributes 0.7 per cent to cyclical factors and the remaining 0.3 per cent to 
increased productivity of computer producers. This implies trend productivity 
growth in the US has remained roughly constant throughout the 1990s outside the 
computer-related sectors. 
In October 1999 the US national accounts were revised and this led Gordon to 
modify his findings. Nonetheless, Gordon (2000) reaches similar conclusions to his 
earlier paper. In addition he argues that information technology has not had as 
large an effect on output growth as did the wave of great innovations introduced 
around the turn of the century such as electricity and the internal combustion 
engine. He argues that computer demand has primarily risen as a consequence of 
lower prices, that much of the development of the Internet represents a substitution 
away from, or a duplication of, pre-existing activities, and that much of the 
investment in new technology simply represents a defence of market share by 
incumbents rather than a conscious effort on behalf of firms to increase investment 
more generally. Furthermore, comparing the periods 1972￿1995 and 1995￿1999, 
he argues that much of the rise in productivity seen in the second half of the 1990s 
reflects an unsustainable cyclical effect and is not a direct result of higher 
investment in computers. Specifically, he estimates that of the 1.4 per cent increase 
in productivity growth since 1972￿1995, 0.6 represents a cyclical effect. He 
attributes the entire remainder to faster multifactor productivity growth in 
computer-related sectors and suggests that there has been no revival in productivity 




Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) do not use a growth-accounting framework in their 
analysis; nevertheless they reach a similar conclusion to Oliner and Sichel (1994, 
2000). They find that computer, and more generally information technology, 
investment can account for a large portion of the productivity growth that spurred 
the accelerated output growth in the late 1990s. They argue that rapid progress in 
semiconductor technology made it possible for downstream industries to reduce 
prices, enabling households and firms to invest in high-tech assets, which in turn 
drove strong output growth. However, they maintain that, while the production of 
high-tech products is a driving force behind recent productivity growth within the 
high-tech sectors, it generally does not spillover into other industries. Finally, they 
highlight the uncertainty surrounding the sustainability of rapid progress in   
high-tech industries and recognise the effect that lower productivity growth in   
tech-producing sectors and slower capital accumulation by high-tech-using sectors 
would have on growth. 
Other studies for the US have generated more divergent estimates of the 
contribution of computers to growth. Whelan (2000) estimates that the use of 
computer hardware contributed 0.8 per cent to output growth between 1996 and 
1998. This is higher than others￿ estimates.3 This is primarily due to a difference in 
measurement rather than concept. In particular, Whelan￿s measure of the capital 
stock is around one-third larger than the one used by Oliner and Sichel. This 
increases his estimate of the income share and in turn the contribution to growth of 
computer capital. Whelan￿s capital stock is larger because he does not allow for 
any loss of efficiency in the productive capital stock before retirement whereas 
Oliner and Sichel make this adjustment.  
Kiley (1999) on the other hand concludes that computer hardware has consistently 
detracted from growth since the mid 1970s. This stems from his assumption that 
there is an installation cost to new investment that detracts from growth. He argues 
that investment in computers involves high installation costs and, consequently, a 
negative contribution of computers to growth. He estimates that in the steady state 
the contribution from computers will be around 0.5 per cent per year. Although 
there may be some significant costs involved when installing new types of 
software and hardware, it is arguable whether they are as large as Kiley suggests.  
                                           
3  For comparison, Oliner and Sichel (2000) estimate the contribution to be 0.6 per cent in the 




Generally, the literature from the US suggests that there are gains to be had   
from both the production and use of high-tech goods. Roughly speaking, of the  
1 per cent increase in productivity growth between the first and second half of the 
1990s, around half of the acceleration can be assigned to the use of IT-related 
goods and around a quarter to advances in the production of computers. That said, 
productivity developments tend to be restricted to the computer-related sectors. 
Evidence suggests that there has been little, or no, revival in the productivity 
growth rates of other sectors attributable to the accelerated growth in high-tech 
industries in the US economy.  
Although the US has been the predominant source of research there has also been 
some work conducted on this issue in the UK. As an alternative to the traditional 
historical growth accounting framework, Bakhshi and Larsen (2001) develop a 
dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model to distinguish between   
investment-specific and sector-neutral sources of labour productivity growth for 
the UK economy. This approach emphasises the importance of substitution effects. 
That is, that rapid technological progress in the production of a given good, say 
high-tech products, leads to falling prices and increased investment, i.e., 
substitution towards computers. Using their DGE model, they find that 
technological progress in high-tech industries may account for around 25 per cent 
of labour productivity growth in the long run. Although they identify the effect that 
progress in the production of high-tech goods may have on productivity growth, 
they make no reference to the contribution that the use of high-tech goods may 
have on productivity and consequently output growth.  
In Australia there have been only a few investigations of the effect of computers on 
productivity growth. The Productivity Commission (Parham, Roberts and   
Sun 2001) investigates the role of information technology in the output and 
productivity growth of the Australian economy and compares it with the US 
experience. In Australia, the contribution of information technology to labour 
productivity growth began to accelerate around 1996. They also find that a large 
proportion of new investment has been in the form of IT capital. Thus, firms have 
generally been replacing older non-IT capital with IT capital.  They provide 
evidence in support of the view that there are productivity gains to be had from the 
use of high-tech goods and not just from their production. The Productivity 
Commission￿s report also investigates the MFP gains from information technology 




relationship between IT use and MFP growth. They cannot detect a consistent 
relationship for other industries. 
Wilson (2000) tells the story that extensive policy reform over the last 15 years has 
led to what he calls the ￿first wave￿ of productivity improvements for Australia and 
that the effect of new economy developments could allow us to benefit from a 
￿second wave￿ of productivity gains in years to come. He estimates that this 
￿second wave￿ could add anywhere between 0.5 and 0.8 per cent to Australia￿s 
annual productivity growth rate over the next ten years. This is attributed to 
increased investment in computer equipment and the growing use of e-commerce 
by business. 
Toohey (2000) analyses the contribution that investment in information technology 
has made to Australia￿s productivity performance and benchmarks his findings to 
the US experience. His results suggest that although both the US and Australia 
experienced stronger output growth over the second half of the 1990s, information 
technology investment contributed 0.25 per cent per annum more to growth in the 
US than in Australia. This is due to the rapid build-up of computer hardware in the 
US relative to Australia. He finds that the US and Australia are remarkably similar 
in terms of IT￿s contributions to growth, and that, although labour accumulation 
was a stronger contributor to US economic growth than to Australia￿s, MFP 
growth was stronger in Australia in the second half of the 1990s than in the US.  
Wilson (2000) and Toohey (2000) both present estimates based upon the ABS￿s 
published capital stock numbers. For reasons that will be explained below these 
data create a number of conceptual problems and so lead to problems interpreting 
or comparing the numbers with, for example, the US studies. This paper represents 
the first attempt to use the appropriate capital stock measures for Australian data. 
3. The  Theory 
3.1 Growth  Accounting 
The method used to identify the effects of capital, labour and productivity on 
growth was introduced by Bob Solow in 1957 (Solow 1957). The underlying 




production function. Nonetheless, the derivation below does not rely on any feature 
of this production function other than it being homogenous of degree one, that is, it 
displays constant returns to scale. 
Suppose output is produced according to Equation (1): 
  (,) YA F K L =⋅  (1) 
where A denotes the level of productivity and K and L are factor inputs of capital 




dY AF dK AF dL dA
A







=+ +    (3) 
where dots over a variable denote the proportionate change, i.e.,  Y dY Y =  .  
Profit maximisation allows us to make some further simplifications. The first order 
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Thus, we can write the decomposition as: 
  (1 ) YK L A αα =− + +     (7) 
where α  is the labour share of income as given in Equation (5). Given measures of 
capital stock growth, labour input growth, labour￿s share of factor income and 
output growth, productivity growth is derived as a residual. 
If more than two factors are considered it is a simple matter to expand the 
production function to include other inputs and the resulting formula is practically 
identical. In particular, capital can be broken into computer capital and other 















3.2 Aggregation  Issues 
As we are using industry-level data the aggregation method is relevant.4 Suppose, 
for now, that the economy can be divided into two industries, 1 and 2, and that the 
only inputs to production in each sector are capital and labour. Three broad ways 
of aggregating the data can be considered: 
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In the first, economy-wide output is the sum of output produced in each industry. 
Here, the output produced in each industry is a function of capital, labour and the 
level of technology in that industry. We will use this method in this paper. The 
second can be thought of as a standard economy-wide Cobb-Douglas function 
where the capital and labour inputs are an index based upon individual industry 
capital stocks and employment. This method assumes that capital and labour are 
complementary across industries as well as industry output.5 In the last there is still 
an economy-wide production function but the aggregation of capital and labour is 
different. In this case, capital and labour inputs are summed across industries. This 
functional form assumes that capital and labour are substitutable across industries. 
However, this assumption is not normally used when industry-level data are 
available. Implicit in this functional form is the assumption that there is no 
difference between capital or labour across sectors; this does not seem highly 
likely. Nonetheless, because they lack industry-level data, Oliner and Sichel (2000) 
                                           
4   Even though we use a Cobb-Douglas production function to illustrate the various methods of 
aggregation, the approach we use does not require this assumption ￿ the only condition we 
require is constant returns to scale. Nonetheless, Carmichael and Dews (1987) find that   
the Cobb-Douglas functional form is a reasonable first approximation for an empirical   
economy-wide production function for Australia. 
5 Equation (10) could be rearranged to look like  2 1Y AY Y =  where 
1 1
1 1 1
β α L K Y = . The 




implicitly use this method. Finally, one could combine the aggregation methods in 
Equations (10) and (11) to produce a production function like: 
 
12
12 1 2 () YA K KLL
αα β =+  (12) 
This is, fundamentally, the specification the ABS uses when it publishes its 
estimate of productivity growth in the national accounts.6  
As each aggregation method makes different assumptions regarding the way the 
economy is ￿structured￿, slightly different measures of output, capital and labour 
indices, and productivity will result. While none is perfect, we choose to use the 
method in Equation (9) due to larger problems with the other approaches. An 
additional reason for choosing this approach is because it means that industry-level 
results and aggregate results are consistent. To generate industry-level results one 
must use industry-level production functions like those in Equation (9). Changing 
to a function like Equation (10) or (11) to generate aggregate results would then 
involve a fundamental change in assumptions. Thus, aggregate MFP calculated 
using Equations (10), (11) or (12) would bear no particular relation to   
industry-level MFP. 
The problem with the capital indices in Equations (10) and (12) is that changes in 
the distribution of capital, or productive units (including both capital and labour), 
across sectors can induce changes in the index even if there is no change in the 
aggregate amount of capital in the economy.7 It is also possible for the capital 
stock to grow in every industry but for the index to decline.8 We find this feature 
undesirable and, thus, choose an alternative method of aggregation. Equation (11), 
on the other hand, makes no distinction between industries or about the distribution 
                                           
6  The estimates referred to are the experimental productivity measures published in the Annual 
National Accounts, ABS Cat No 5204.0. These can be found in Table 20 of the 2000-01 
National Accounts. 
7  The following numerical example may help to illustrate the point. Suppose that there are five 
units of capital, four in Industry 1 and one in Industry 2. Also, suppose that there is no labour 
involved in the production process and that the coefficients reflect income shares ￿ an 
assumption that comes directly from assuming that firms maximise profit. By moving one 
unit of capital from Industry 1 to Industry 2 the capital index and output would be decreased 
since 
5 / 2 5 / 3 5 / 1 5 / 4 2 3 1 4 > . This seems an undesirable property. 
8  The following numbers may help to illustrate this point: 
23 / 2 23 / 21 21 / 1 21 / 20 2 21 1 20 > . The 




of inputs across industries. Thus, output is unaffected if all the labour is 
concentrated in one industry or spread evenly across all industries regardless of the 
distribution of capital. However, as mentioned above, this equation is only given to 
show the implicit aggregation method used when industry-level data are 
unavailable. Finally, since Equation (12) inherits problems from both of the other 
methods we also choose to avoid it. Nonetheless, to provide an estimate of the 
effect our choice has on the aggregate results we present results from using the 
alternative formulations in Section 5.2. 
3.3 Alternative  Assumptions 
While it has been standard in the literature to assume constant returns to scale and 
profit maximisation, it is conceivable that these assumptions may not hold. Since 
Hall (1988) demonstrated that macroeconomic data in the US are inconsistent with 
the joint hypothesis of constant returns to scale and marginal cost pricing, the 
assumption of constant returns to scale has been under pressure. Unfortunately, 
attempts to quantify the degree of departure from constant returns to scale and 
reconcile this with observations about industry structure have been unsatisfactory. 
For example, if industries exhibit increasing returns to scale, theory would suggest 
that they would tend towards monopolisation; however, very few industries are, in 
fact, monopolised. Investigating the returns to scale of Australian industries would 
be a worthwhile project but is beyond the scope of this paper. We proceed by 
making the standard assumption of constant returns to scale while acknowledging 
that our findings would need to be revised if significant departures from constant 
returns to scale for Australian industries are demonstrated in the future. 
Strictly interpreted, the assumption of profit maximisation in this work implies that 
firms adjust their inputs to profit maximising levels every year. If adjustment takes 
longer than a year, because there are costs to adjustment or new technologies take 
some time to be adopted, this will not be true. In particular, firms may have levels 
of computer capital that are below the profit maximising level in certain years due 
to limits on their speed of adjustment. In this case the marginal value product of 
computer capital will exceed its price. This could lead to a systematic 
overstatement of MFP growth and understatement of the contribution of computer 
capital to growth. This phenomenon is part of a broader problem with the 
measurement of computer productivity and embodied technical change. 




estimating the degree of embodied technical change (i.e., comparing the output 
from this year￿s 2GHz Pentium 4 with last year￿s 1GHz Pentium III) a similar 
understatement of computer capital￿s contribution to growth and overstatement of 
MFP growth will result.9 It is difficult to assess the extent of this problem. To 
address this issue we consider whether there is any consistent correlation between 
computer use and MFP growth across industries in Section 6.2. As argued above, 
problems with measurement or adjustment costs should show up in a correlation 
between computer use and MFP growth. The results from Section 6.2, that there is 
no discernable correlation, suggest that this problem may not be a significant 
source of error in our calculations. However, the difficulties involved in the whole 
exercise mean that the problem may just be well disguised ￿ we are far from 
dogmatic about this point. Nonetheless, the results in Section 6.2 suggest there is 
no prima facie case for systematic errors distorting the MFP growth and computer 
contribution numbers. 
4. The  Data 
While the theory used in this paper is relatively straightforward, the practice is 
more complicated. Getting adequate measures of the capital stock is not easy. 
Furthermore, the task is made more complex since, for the purposes of growth 
accounting, a slightly different measure of the capital stock to that which is 
normally used is needed. The capital stock traditionally reported in national 
accounts statistics is the wealth capital stock whereas the capital stock required for 
growth accounting exercises is the productive capital stock. The distinction is that 
the wealth capital stock measures what the stock could be sold for at a given point 
in time whereas the productive capital stock measures its income-producing 
capacity. A simple example may illustrate the difference more clearly: suppose the 
capital stock consists of two computers ￿ a two-year-old Mac and a new Pentium. 
Suppose, furthermore, that computers last for four years and then cease to function 
with no residual value (except, perhaps, as a paperweight or modern art). Finally, 
assume that there is no decline in computer efficiency with age. If the two 
computers have the same output then the current income capital stock would be  
2 Pentium equivalent units. The wealth capital stock, however, would be less. The 
                                           





two-year-old Mac only has half its service life left and so, abstracting from 
discounting, the wealth capital stock is only 1‰ Pentium equivalent units.  
It is possible to relax the assumption that computers maintain full efficiency 
throughout their life. Making different assumptions about the decline in efficiency 
of computers leads to a slight change in the arithmetic and more substantial effects 
on the calculated capital stocks. Nonetheless, this assumption does not affect the 
concepts involved. 
The data used in this exercise are unpublished ABS estimates of the productive 
capital stock and rental returns to different types of capital, all broken down by 
industry within the market sector.10 The ABS makes an adjustment for declining 
efficiency over the life of the capital in addition to calculating the appropriate 
productive capital measure. Conceptually, these estimates are the same as those of 
the BLS in the US, whose data has been used by most US researchers in this field. 
Nonetheless, there are still a number of assumptions that differ between the   
two estimates that make direct comparison problematic. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the results are sensitive to the underlying assumptions for 
which no good benchmarks exist.  
A further limitation in the accounts at the industry level is the apportionment of 
taxes and subsidies on products. Currently the ABS values industry output at basic 
prices, i.e., excluding taxes and subsidies on industry outputs but including taxes 
and subsidies on their production. Their rental income estimates, on the other hand, 
include taxes and subsidies on products. Ideally we would like all the components 
of the calculation to be valued on a consistent basis. However, while this is a 
problem, there are reasons to suspect that the effect may be limited. The   
growth-accounting exercise is primarily concerned with growth rates rather than 
levels. To the extent that taxes and subsidies are proportional to output this should 
not affect the industry-level growth estimates. Furthermore, it is a simple matter to 
check the size of the effect at the aggregate level since the ABS publishes the 
growth rate of gross value added (GVA) for the market sector valued at both basic 
                                           
10 We are grateful to the Capital, Production and Deflators Section of the ABS for providing 




and market prices.11 This comparison indicates that in any given year the 
difference could be up to 0.5 per cent. However, over the longer term the 
differences tend to average out. Thus, between 1989/90 and 1999/2000 the average 
annual growth rate only differs by 0.1 per cent. 
The apportioning of taxes and subsidies also has an effect on the estimate of the 
capital share of income at the industry level. The ABS capital income estimates 
include taxes and subsidies on products while the published gross value added by 
industry estimates do not. This leads to an overestimate of the capital share of 
income. Lacking estimates of GVA at market prices by industry, it is difficult to be 
certain of the size of the effect. Nonetheless, an idea of the size of the 
mismeasurement can be gained in aggregate. Taxes and subsidies on products are, 
on average, 7￿8 per cent of GVA valued at basic prices. This suggests, with an 
average capital share around 40 per cent in Australia, that the estimate of the 
capital share may be up to 3 percentage points too high. This figure does, 
unfortunately, vary by industry as products from some industries receive 
significant subsidies while others incur significant taxes. For the time being this 
paper proceeds by noting that the final estimates are based on a capital share that 
may be up to 3 percentage points too high and, consequently, that the contribution 
of capital may be overstated by an average of 7￿8 per cent and that the contribution 
of labour may be understated by a similar amount. This could have flow-on effects 
to the residual MFP component but the size of this effect will depend upon the 
growth rates of capital and labour and so is not readily estimable. Nonetheless, 
given the other sources of error in these estimates, an 8 per cent variation will not 
significantly alter any of the conclusions. 
5. Results 
With the appropriate data assembled it is a simple matter to calculate income 
shares, growth rates and the residual, multifactor productivity. In line with 
previous practice the income-share weights used in the growth-accounting exercise 
are averages of the income shares in the two years the growth is measured over. 
                                           
11 The growth rate of real GVA valued at market prices is published in ABS Cat No 5204.0 
(2000￿2001), Table 20. The growth rate of real GVA valued at basic prices can be calculated 




Thus, computer growth from 1990/91 to 1991/92 is weighted by the average 
income share of computers in these two years. This is, in part, an allowance for the 
fact that calculations are made at discrete intervals whereas the derivation is 
properly applied to continuous data. 
To aid the exposition we begin by discussing the aggregate economy-wide results 
before moving on to the more detailed industry-level estimates. The aggregate 
results are generated by weighting the industry-level results together by their 
respective output shares. Specifically, assuming that there are two industries 
indexed by 1 and 2, total output is given by  12 YYY =+  and all other terms are the 
same as in Equation (9), the overall contribution of capital to output growth can be 
calculated as: 
  12
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5.1 Aggregate  Results 
It is common practice to average results over a run of years due to the substantial 
variations in productivity that can occur in any given year. These variations are 
generally related to cyclical forces so the preferred period covers an entire 
productivity cycle; this way the cyclical forces should ￿average out￿. Most   
US studies have presented results averaged over the first and second halves of the 
90s. As Parham et al (2001) argue, this choice can substantially distort the 
findings, as the periods involved are not complete cycles. Thus, we present results 
in this section for the period 1993/94￿1999/2000, the latest productivity cycle as 
defined by the ABS. We do, however, present results using the ￿traditional￿ split as 
well. Despite problems, this split still provides a useful picture of how IT 
investment has changed over the 1990s. 
Table 1 presents the results for output growth and the various contributions to 
growth. It also presents memo items of the growth rate of the computer stock and 
other inputs. The time periods average the growth contributions calculated for each 
(financial) year in the sample. Thus, the first column presents the average of 
growth for the 1993/94 financial years through to the 1999/2000 financial years ￿ 




Table 1: Contributions to Growth 
 1993/94￿1999/2000  1990/91￿1994/95  1995/96￿2000/01
Output growth  4.51 1.78  3.86 
Contributions from:      
IT capital  1.13  0.89  1.26 
Hardware 0.70  0.42  0.84 
Software 0.43  0.47  0.42 
Other capital  0.62  0.15  0.60 
Labour hours  1.09  ￿0.37  0.57 
MFP 1.67  1.11  1.43 
Income shares:      
Hardware 2.3  1.8  2.4 
Software 2.5  2.4  2.5 
Other capital  34.2  34.8  34.0 
Labour 60.9  61.1  61.1 
Growth rate of inputs:      
Hardware 36.7  22.0  36.9 
Software 15.5  18.8  17.1 
Other capital  1.1  0.2  1.0 
Labour 1.5  ￿0.8  0.7 
Note:  All numbers are expressed as percentages per annum. 
 
Generally speaking, we see that Australia has experienced extremely high levels of 
multifactor productivity growth in addition to significant gains from the   
￿capital-deepening￿ effects from computer technology. While MFP growth was the 
largest single contributor to growth between 1993/94 and 1999/2000, capital 
deepening attributable to computer use added over 1 per cent per annum to output 
growth. 
Looking at the change between the first and second halves of the decade we see 
that MFP and labour use have been the primary sources of the acceleration in 
output growth. This partially reflects the fact that the first half of the sample 
includes a recession that was associated with labour reductions and lower rates of 
productivity growth. IT investment has been relatively steady over the decade 
accounting for only 0.37 per cent of the 2.08 per cent pickup in growth across the 
decade. That being said, the contribution of computer capital to growth has been at 




unaffected by the early 1990s recession. What is also clear is the amazing growth 
in the stock of hardware and software. This has been sustained by both increasing 
nominal expenditure and large price falls fuelling an increase in real inputs. We 
will return to the split between these two forces in Section 6.  
5.2 Robustness  Checks 
As mentioned above, the differing aggregation assumptions may lead to different 
estimates of MFP and the contribution to growth of computers. Table 2 compares 
the results using Equation (9), as already reported in Table 1, with those from 
using Equation (12), the ABS method.  
Table 2: Comparison of Aggregation Methods 
  1993/94–1999/00 1990/91–1994/95 1995/96–2000/01 












Output growth  4.51 4.70  1.78 2.07  3.86  4.04 
Contributions from:           
IT  capital  1.13 1.24  0.89 0.80  1.26  1.42 
Hardware  0.70 0.77  0.42 0.35  0.84  0.88 
Software  0.43 0.47  0.47 0.45  0.42  0.54 
Other  capital  0.62 0.40  0.15 0.29  0.60  0.35 
Labour hours  1.09  1.20  ￿0.37  ￿0.07  0.56  0.77 
MFP  1.67 1.86  1.11 1.05  1.44  1.50 
Income  shares:           
Hardware  2.3 2.3  1.8 1.8  2.4  2.4 
Software  2.5 2.6  2.4 2.4  2.5  2.5 
Other  capital  34.3 36.7  34.7 37.0  34.0  36.6 
Labour  60.9 58.4  61.1 58.8  61.1  58.5 
Growth rate of inputs:           
Hardware  36.7 32.1  22.0 19.3  36.9  36.2 
Software  15.5 18.9  18.8 19.2  17.1  21.7 
Other  capital  1.1 4.4  0.2 2.7  1.0  4.7 
Labour 1.5  1.7  ￿0.8  ￿0.1  0.7  1.0 
Notes:  All numbers are expressed as percentages per annum. Differences in output growth rates are due to the 





What we see is that there are few substantial changes in the picture. While 
individual results vary (up to 0.3 per cent in the case of labour hours in the first 
half of the 1990s) the broad sweep of the results is unaffected. On this basis we are 
reasonably confident about the robustness of our results to the particular 
aggregation method chosen. 
5.3 Industry  Results 
Rather than look at all industries, we will focus on some pertinent results from 
certain industries to highlight the main findings. A table of the results for all 
industries can be found in Appendix A. The contribution of computers to growth 
by sector is presented in Figure 4 below. 


























































































































































Note:   Contribution to growth measures the growth in output attributable to the growth of computer hardware 




Looking at the broad patterns we see that traditional primary and secondary 
industries have not been significant beneficiaries from the IT revolution. That is, 
they have not incorporated high levels of IT capital directly into their production 
techniques. These results are more or less similar to the pattern of investment 
shown in Figure 3. The principal beneficiaries have been the service sectors, in 
particular communications and finance. This bias towards the service sectors is 
interesting. In the US most of the gains in productivity, and by implication the 
gains from computers, have been concentrated in manufacturing. This reflects the 
high level of computer and computer-related production in the US. Further 
evidence referred to by the Productivity Commission (Parham et al 2001) suggests 
that the gains from use have been concentrated in wholesale and retail trade, and 
finance, insurance and real estate. This suggests some overlap between the 
Australian and US experiences. At the same time, the results for electricity, gas 
and water (EGW) and communications highlight some results that are peculiar to 
Australia. These sectors have been deregulated as a part of the microeconomic 
reform undertaken over the 1980s and 1990s in Australia. The high levels of 
investment, particularly in computers, in these sectors would seem to be a product 
of this regulatory change. 
Nonetheless, this pattern masks some important points. Examination of   
input-output tables for Australia allows us to identify the contribution of an input, 
say high-tech goods, to final output and the intensity of use of that input relative to 
others in the production process. This enables us to obtain a better indication of the 
effect on various industries from particular new economy goods and services. For 
instance, communication and business services incorporate much of the new 
economy. We can focus on the extent to which communication and business 
services are used as an input to production by industries to gain a better idea of the 
influence of high-tech capital on these industries. We do this by calculating the 
total requirement for inputs, including any intermediate use of goods and services, 
by industries as a percentage of final output for each industry. These ￿total 
requirement coefficients￿ represent the dollar amount of an input required to 
produce $100 of final output for each industry.  
Figure 5 shows that ￿old economy￿ industries, while low direct users of IT, are 
high users of ￿new economy￿ inputs. While it is difficult to separate IT services 
from other services, they are most likely to be concentrated in the communications 




classified in the business services industry and Internet providers in the 
communications industry. Based on data for 1996/97, primary industries12 used 
just under $3.00 of communications services and around $13.00 of business 
services for each $100 of output produced.13 This usage is similar to that in 
manufacturing, EGW and construction. On average, service sectors used just under 
$4.00 of communications services and around $16.00 of business services to 
produce $100 of output. Thus, the gap in usage between primary and secondary 
sectors, and service sectors may not be as large as the results in Figure 4 suggest. 
Many primary sectors would seem to contract out their IT requirements. 
Figure 5: Total Requirement Coefficients 

























































































































































  For communications
  For business services
 
                                           
12 Agriculture; forestry, fishing and hunting; and mining. 
13 See Appendix B for a table of total requirement coefficients for each industry. We use data for 




This highlights a fact that is obvious but deserves mention. The heaviest users of 
computer technology in Australia provide services to other industries. Thus, while 
the growth-accounting procedure we use highlights high MFP growth and large 
gains from capital deepening through computer usage in the communications 
sector, other sectors benefit through falls in telecommunications costs.14 Similarly, 
large gains in productivity in retailing through the use of bar coding and scanning 
have translated into lower prices at supermarkets and faster checkout times. 
Turning to specific industry results, the electricity, gas and water (EGW) sector 
results are particularly interesting. This industry experienced a decline in 
multifactor productivity yet a marked increase in IT investment. Looking more 
closely reveals that high rates of MFP growth in the first half of the 1990s were a 
product of significant job cuts in the industry. Hours worked declined by around ⅓ 
over the decade with most reductions coming in the first half. Similarly, currently 
low levels of calculated MFP growth are a reflection of very high levels of 
investment in IT capital. If these investments have not been fully integrated in the 
production process, it may be a few years before output responds. Nonetheless, the 
predominant force in this industry over the decade has been the dramatic structural 
reorganisation culminating in the privatisation of much of the sector. Given this 
change it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions about the performance of the 
sector. 
Communications was similarly deregulated. This deregulation has spurred 
investment by many new participants as well as by the incumbent. The output 
growth effects of this high investment, seen in Figure 4, have been sustained for 
the past decade. In contrast to EGW there has also been significant MFP growth in 
communications throughout the decade (Appendix A). We address the extent to 
which these MFP patterns can be attributed to IT investment in the next section. 
                                           
14 The deregulation of national phone companies is obviously a major factor in phone call costs. 
Nonetheless, the development of computerised switching devices, fibre optic cables and the 





6. Two  Interesting  Questions 
Having covered the basic results from the growth-accounting exercise we turn to 
two more interesting questions. 
6.1  What is the Counterfactual? 
In assessing the benefit from computer use we have not explicitly considered what 
the alternative to computer investment may have been. Thus, discussion about the 
net benefit from information technology is difficult. This section constructs 
estimates of the net benefit from computers by making a number of assumptions. 
As with all counterfactual exercises these assumptions are not the only ones that 
could be made, but seem reasonable to us. As such the results they generate should 
be considered ￿ballpark￿ figures rather than precise estimates. 
We focus on what would have happened if the computer industry had not been 
characterised by the rapid productivity increases that are at the heart of the 
industry￿s uniqueness. We look at what would have happened to output if the 
computer price deflator had remained unchanged rather than falling rapidly as, in 
fact, occurred. The falls in the deflator reflect both improvements in the power of 
computers and falls in their price but the exact division between these two is 
unimportant. Specifically, we assume the same nominal spending on computers as 
occurred but compute a new series for real spending by assuming that the computer 
price deflator was flat from 1989/90. If the industry production functions are   
Cobb-Douglas this calculation will, in fact, reflect what fully optimising firms 
would have done ￿ income shares of inputs remain constant regardless of relative 
price fluctuations. Alternatively, if the relevant industry production functions are 
not unit elastic then this will be an approximation. 
Another way of considering this exercise is that we decompose the contribution of 
computers to output growth into the parts attributable to price falls and those 
attributable to increased expenditure. We take 1989/90 as the base year for these 
calculations as it marks the beginning of our sample. Using this interpretation it is 
possible to view the counterfactual as the situation that would have resulted if the 
producers of information technology had retained all of the productivity gains and 
not passed any on to users in the form of lower prices. This is, perhaps, the more 




technological and output gains Australia has realised solely from being a user of 
information technology, i.e., by focusing on those improvements in computer 
manufacturing that have been passed on to users in the form of lower prices. 
Combining the nominal investment series with the new price deflator gives us a 
series for real investment. With the new series for real investment we calculate a 
series for the counterfactual capital stock. We approximate the depreciation 
function used by the ABS by computing the average depreciation on the capital 
stock for each industry in each year. Predictably, these steps result in a series for 
the productive capital stock that grows much more slowly than the actual. As we 
assume that firms are optimising each period the income shares calculated with the 
actual series should reflect the technological parameters of the production function, 
regardless of whether the underlying function is Cobb-Douglas or not. Thus, we 
use these same weights in calculating the contribution of computers to output 
growth in our counterfactual exercise. 
6.1.1 Results 
Table 3 presents the relevant results from this exercise:15 
Table 3: Counterfactual Results – Computers’ Contribution to Growth 






1990/91￿1994/95 0.64  0.89  0.25 
1995/96￿1999/2000 0.59  1.26  0.67 
 
As the results make clear a substantial proportion of the gains from information 
technology have come in the form of lower prices. Because of our assumption in 
the counterfactual exercise that prices remain at 1990 levels the difference also 
grows with time. Prices for hardware fell by an average of 16 per cent per year 
over the 1990s to be six times cheaper in 2000 than in 1990. Thus, had productivity 
improvements not been passed on in the form of lower prices, output in Australia 
could have been lower by an average of (0.25+0.70)/2 ≅  0.5 per cent per annum. 
                                           
15 This table uses the most recent numbers available to us from the ABS, which, in this case, end 




Or, compounding the individual annual effects, output in 1999/2000 would have 
been 4.8 per cent lower than it actually was. 
Viewed another way, this shows that Australia has benefited from intense 
competition in a sector where productivity advances are quickly passed on to users 
through lower prices. This finding does not suggest that there are no gains to 
producers and innovators in information technology, merely that users have 
received some fairly large benefits along the way ￿ users have by no means been 
left behind in the IT revolution. 
Another implication is also clear. Australia has increased its nominal spending on 
computers significantly. This increase in expenditure alone accounts for 
approximately 0.6 per cent per annum of output growth. This is the direct 
reflection of the increase in computer investment from just under 2 per cent of 
GDP in 1989/90 to over 3 per cent in 1999/2000 and the corresponding increase in 
computers￿ share of income (in the market sector) from 3.3 per cent in 1989/90 to 
5.1 per cent in 1999/2000. This increase represents a sustained shift in production 
methods to more intensive use of computers. This raises the possibility that, in 
contrast to our assumptions, firms have been unable to fully adjust to the new 
technology optimally each year. We address this potential problem in the next 
section. 
6.2  Is Computer Use Associated with Higher MFP Growth? 
We now turn to the second question ￿ are there spillovers from computer use to 
MFP growth? One reason that we might worry about spillovers is because of 
mismeasurement of the real capital stock. It is very difficult to measure the real 
quantity of computer capital. Comparing a 2GHz Pentium 4 with a 40GB hard 
drive and 128MB of RAM with a 1GHz Pentium III with a 20GB hard drive and 
64MB of RAM is hard enough let alone trying to compare a Pentium 4 with a 
Macintosh G4. While the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in the US addresses 
some issues with its hedonic index, it is clearly imperfect. The rapid pace of 
improvement in information technology compounds these problems meaning that, 
even if a good estimate of the real capital stock at one point of time can be 
computed, it is likely to be inaccurate within a short period of time. Given the 
likelihood that computer capital is mismeasured some people have suggested that 




Alternatively, and potentially additionally, there may be disembodied 
technological change associated with computer use. Thus, computer use may be 
associated with new ways of organising business that are inherently more 
productive. In this case, productivity improvements would not be directly tied to 
the quantity of computer capital used but result merely from the fact that firms had 
reorganised their operations to use computers. In this case there may also be some 
correlation between MFP growth and computer use. 
Thirdly, adjustment costs may mean that firms have less capital at a given point in 
time than the profit-maximising level. If this is the case, the marginal product of 
computers will be higher than measured through the growth accounting-technique. 
This, in turn, means that computers￿ contribution to growth will be understated and 
MFP growth overstated. 
Finally, firms may have overinvested in computer capital. That is, firms were 
swayed by the hype surrounding the ￿new economy￿ and undertook excessive 
investment in computers. In this case, the output from computers would be lower 
than the price paid for them. If this were the case one might expect to see a 
negative correlation between IT use and MFP growth. 
To examine if any of these problems may be present we look at the industry-level 
data for Australia to see if there is any correlation between computer use and MFP 
growth across industries. We present two figures to examine this question. The 
first shows MFP growth and IT income shares for each industry (except 
agriculture) for the periods 1989/90￿1994/95 and 1995/96￿2000/01.16 It suggests 
that higher computer use may be associated with higher MFP growth. 
                                           
16 Agriculture is excluded from the figure due to the large fluctuation in MFP associated with 
weather patterns. It is possible to use other measures on the vertical axis, such as IT￿s 

















































This figure shows some suggestion of a positive correlation. Nonetheless, the 
correlation is dominated by a few industries that experienced strong growth in 
MFP and had high computer use, most notably communications. There are many 
reasons one might question this approach. Different industries may grow at 
different rates for reasons other than computer use. Alternatively, there may be 
distortions to these results due to deregulation. Some of the best performers are 
service industries. Telecommunications, for example, was deregulated in 1991 and 
might have been expected to experience higher productivity as a result. To control 
for this we present a figure showing the change in MFP growth between   
1990/91￿1994/95 and 1995/96￿2000/01 against the change in computer usage. 
This allows for industry fixed effects, in other words, that some sectors may have a 
higher rate of growth independently of their computer usage. 
The results from this transformation of the data suggest that there is no obvious 
MFP spillover. With the exception of the one outlier (EGW), there is no obvious 
correlation in Figure 7. This suggests that the relation seen in Figure 6 reflects 
factors other than IT usage. However, the lack of correlation also provides no 




























































Notes:  ACC: Accommodation; COM: Communications; CON: Construction; CUL: Cultural; EGW: Electricity, 
gas and water; FIN: Finance; MIN: Mining; MNF: Manufacturing; RTL: Retail; TRN: Transport;   
WHL: Wholesale 
The fact that EGW is such an outlier suggests that its results have been 
significantly affected by industry deregulation. Thus, it would be wise to wait for 
more data before drawing any general conclusions about the effect of IT on the 
EGW sector. 
Notwithstanding the results in Figure 7, it is still possible that there is a correlation 
between productivity and computer usage. The ABS, in constructing its estimates, 
does not assume that rates of return are equalised across industries. Instead it 
calculates an internal rate of return for each industry such that all its other 
estimates are consistent. That is, the internal rate of return for each industry 
becomes the residual and absorbs all the errors made in the process. If the internal 
rate of return is higher in industries that use computers more intensively this may 
be a sign of spillovers from computer use to broader productivity growth. We have, 





Before considering the implications of these results it is worth reiterating the lack 
of precision in these estimates. Capital stock estimates are notoriously difficult to 
construct as are the estimates of income shares for computers. This combined with 
the treatment of tax in the underlying data mean that there is inevitably a range of 
error around the estimates. That being said, the estimates are the best available 
based on the best available data. 
The estimates obtained in this paper are larger than previous estimates of the 
benefit from computer use both in Australia and in the US. Table 4 below 
compares the estimates from these previous studies and recalculates the results 
from Table 1 over the shorter sample period that has been used in previous 
studies.17 
There are enough differences between the studies that one should be cautious about 
drawing too much out of the precise figures. Between the Australian results the 
sectoral coverage is different as are the underlying capital data. The US results are 
based upon aggregate economy-wide results whereas ours are based upon   
industry-level data. Additionally, there is a difference in the treatment of labour 
inputs. Oliner and Sichel￿s results for the US include an estimate of quality 
adjusted labour inputs ￿ generated by looking at changes in education and 
experience of the labour force. The ABS is currently working on an experimental 
labour quality adjustment but full results are not yet available. The preliminary 
results suggest that over the period 1994/95 to 2000/01 the contribution to growth 
of quality improvements in labour was only 0.15 per cent per annum.18 Due to the 
preliminary nature of these estimates no adjustment is included in Table 4. 
Consequently the MFP estimates for Australia include any ￿residual￿ effect from 
improved labour quality. However, using the preliminary estimates as a guide, 
subtracting 0.15 per cent per annum from MFP growth would not change any 
substantive features of the comparison with the US. 
                                           
17 Wilson (2000) looks at the contributions to labour productivity growth so the results are not 
directly comparable. The results in Table 4 also differ slightly from those originally reported 
in Gruen (2001). This is a result of minor revisions to the method, error checking, and some 
changes in the data. None of the differences change the story in any significant way. 
18 See the feature article in the September quarter 2001 National Accounts, ABS Cat No 5206.0, 




Table 4: Comparison of Results 
  Australia
(a) US 
  This paper  Toohey  Oliner and Sichel 
 1991￿95  1996￿99  1991￿95  1996￿99 1991￿95  1996￿99 
Growth rate of output 1.78  4.47 2.47  4.35 2.75  4.82 
Contribution from:           
IT  capital  0.89  1.20 0.54  0.74 0.57  1.10 
Hardware  0.42  0.87 0.25  0.36 0.25  0.63 
Software  0.47  0.33 0.21  0.24 0.25  0.32 
Communications  ￿  ￿  0.08 0.13  0.07 0.15 
Other  capital  0.15  0.76 0.86  1.10 0.44  0.75 
Labour  ￿0.37  0.35 0.40  0.87 1.26  1.81 
MFP  1.11  2.16 0.67  1.64 0.48  1.16 
Income shares:           
Hardware  1.8  2.4 1.3  1.4 1.4  1.8 
Software  2.4  2.6 1.2  1.4 2.0  2.5 
Growth rate of inputs:          
Hardware  22.0  41.6 18.9  25.7 17.5  35.9 
Software  18.8  13.9 17.8  17.4 13.1  13.0 
Notes:  (a) Dates used are financial year periods, e.g., 1991￿95 indicates 1990/91￿1994/95. 
  Results for Toohey were obtained from the author and include some results not originally published. 
 
Notwithstanding these points, this table highlights the difference between the 
experience of Australia and the US over the 1990s. While GDP growth rates in the 
market sector were broadly similar, the US achieved this expansion by employing 
more labour while Australia has seen little change in the contribution from labour. 
Instead, most of the gains have been made through MFP growth. 
There has also been a slightly larger contribution from capital, and in particular 
computer capital, to growth in Australia. Given that most of the ￿new-economy￿ 
innovations originated in the US, this seems a surprising result. It may be that 
Australia achieved higher computer-capital contributions to growth over the 1990s 
by gradually ￿catching-up￿ to the US. But it is hard to be sure. There are enough 
differences in statistical treatment that it is difficult to make confident statements 




What is most remarkable in Australia is the rate of MFP growth. Results from 
Section 6.2 suggest that we cannot clearly attribute this to our higher use of 
computers. In the absence of other candidates we can only suggest that the 
microeconomic reform of the 1980s and 1990s has paid handsome productivity 
dividends in the late 1990s. 
Our decomposition in Section 6.1 allows us to consider some implications for the 
future. Production methods are in the process of being reorganised towards greater 
use of computer inputs. This change is reflected in their increasing income share. 
To the extent that this is a transitional feature we would expect the income share of 
computers to stabilise at some time in the future. When this occurs, the rising 
income share will no longer make a contribution to growth. Our estimates suggest 
that this contribution may be up to 0.6 per cent per year. 
The other half of our decomposition highlights the benefits from the rapid 
technological advances that have occurred. These have added about 5 per cent to 
output over the course of this decade. Should technological progress or price 
reductions slow then this contribution to growth would also fall. Nonetheless, 
despite recent weakness in the industry, there are few signs that the pace of 
technological improvement or price falls passed on to users are declining. This 
gives us reason to believe that computers will continue to make a significant 
contribution to output growth for the foreseeable future. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the historical gains from the use of information technology 
in Australia. Our analysis suggests that Australia has done well out of the ￿new 
economy￿. Its use of computer technology is amongst the highest in the world with 
Australian business investment in computer and related equipment growing rapidly 
since the early 1990s. Furthermore, we find that around one-half of the gains from 
the use of IT can be attributed to price falls while the other half can be attributed to 
higher expenditure on computers. We arrive at the conclusion that Australia has 
experienced significant output growth related to computer use and that, as a user of 
IT, we will continue to gain significantly in the future provided that technological 





Appendix A:  Industry-level Contributions to Growth 
Table A1: Industry-level Contributions to Growth 
  Agriculture Mining  Manufacturing EGW  Construction  Wholesale  trade 
  1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95  1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 
Output growth  ￿1.51 6.40  4.10  4.89  0.71 2.46  2.28  2.00 0.43  1.64  1.91 4.56 
Contributions from:                    
IT capital  0.15  0.25  0.18  0.20  0.65  1.10  0.72  1.54  0.61  0.57  1.06  1.11 
Hardware 0.11  0.18  0.06  0.16  0.32  0.91  0.42  1.39  0.31  0.37  0.36  0.67 
Software 0.04  0.07  0.12  0.04  0.33  0.19  0.30  0.15  0.30  0.20  0.70  0.44 
Other capital  ￿0.78  ￿0.53  2.27  2.74  ￿0.08  0.66  ￿0.09  0.14  ￿0.06  0.09  ￿0.43  ￿0.35 
Labour hours  ￿0.54  0.14  ￿0.66  ￿0.49  ￿1.38  ￿0.54  ￿1.32  ￿0.88  0.00  2.08  ￿0.23  0.22 
MFP ￿0.34  6.54  2.31  2.44  1.52  1.24  2.97  1.20  ￿0.12  ￿1.10  1.51  3.58 
Income shares:                     
Hardware 0.63  0.63  0.25  0.45  1.35  2.44  1.80  3.71  1.15  1.58  1.45  2.20 
Software 0.19  0.31  0.54  0.55  1.66  1.71  1.27  1.49  1.34  1.48  3.18  3.44 
Other capital  55.33  55.21  71.38  73.47  33.05  34.30  61.66  68.67  19.02  18.89  23.85  19.93 
Labour 43.85  43.85  27.83  25.53  63.94  61.55  35.27  26.13  78.49  78.05  71.52  74.43 
Growth of inputs:                     
Hardware 22.75  28.52  14.62  47.61  24.46  41.10  21.63  36.08  24.72  25.11  21.40  35.87 
Software 21.44  22.01  21.40  16.13  21.22  16.42  21.52  12.58  22.10  15.96  21.29  16.14 
Other capital  ￿0.56  ￿0.87  3.28  3.88  ￿0.46  1.20  ￿0.25  0.64  0.93  0.24  ￿2.17  ￿2.76 
Labour ￿1.36  0.42  ￿2.36  ￿1.93  ￿2.06  ￿0.85  ￿3.76  ￿2.71  ￿0.13  2.61  ￿0.33  0.28 
  




Table A1: Industry-level Contributions to Growth (continued) 
  Retail trade  Accommodation  Transport    Communications  Finance  Cultural 
 1991￿95  1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 1991￿95 1996￿2001 
Output growth  2.23 3.82 2.63 3.97 3.19 3.49 9.09 10.32 1.43 4.91  2.65 4.10 
Contributions from:                        
IT  capital  0.96 1.05 0.80 0.80 0.95 0.90 1.68  2.44 2.15 3.60  1.11 1.25 
Hardware  0.51 0.81 0.38 0.64 0.52 0.63 0.55  2.07 0.89 1.66  0.49 1.08 
Software  0.45 0.24 0.42 0.16 0.43 0.27 1.13  0.37 1.26 1.94  0.62 0.17 
Other  capital  0.08  0.13  0.18  0.91  0.13  0.25  1.19  2.22 ￿0.35 ￿0.13  1.83  3.78 
Labour  hours  0.91 1.04 2.88 3.16 0.23 1.20 0.94  1.61  ￿1.59 0.91  2.14 1.01 
MFP  0.28 1.60  ￿1.23  ￿0.90 1.88 1.14 5.28  4.05 1.22 0.53  ￿2.43  ￿1.94 
Income shares:                         
Hardware  1.59 2.62 1.21 1.91 2.56 2.39 2.62  3.63 4.56 4.75  1.69 2.67 
Software  2.17 2.02 2.18 1.80 2.15 2.06 5.56  5.58 5.60 6.98  2.82 2.48 
Other  capital  16.39 11.83 18.78 19.77 30.46 29.59 38.72  41.42 29.90 27.40  38.18 35.11 
Labour  79.85 83.53 77.83 76.52 64.83 65.96 53.10  49.36 59.94 60.87  57.31 59.74 
Growth of inputs:                        
Hardware  31.21 33.20 33.04 37.07 20.94 26.91 21.69  58.38 17.15 34.41  27.57 45.35 
Software  21.42 16.16 20.61 15.61 21.14 14.13 20.96  11.59 21.83 27.41  22.30 14.43 
Other  capital  ￿0.54  ￿3.05 2.15 5.50 0.31 1.96 2.04  4.95 1.70  ￿0.34  5.78  11.28 
Labour  1.15 1.23 3.69 4.12 0.41 1.84 1.83  3.29  ￿2.66 1.53  3.72 1.68 
Note:  Dates used are financial year periods, e.g., 1991￿95 indicates 1990/91￿1994/95. 36 
   
Appendix B:  Total Requirement Coefficients 
Table B1: Total Requirement Coefficients
(a) 
Using input-output tables for 1996/97 
Requirement by industry:  For communications  For business services 
Agriculture 2.6  12.6 
Mining 2.6  14.5 
Manufacturing 3.3  19.8 
Electricity, gas and water  2.4  13.0 
Construction 2.4  21.7 
Wholesale trade  6.8  40.4 
Retail trade  7.3  31.2 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants  4.5  24.9 
Transport and storage  4.5  21.6 
Communication services    15.1 
Finance and insurance  3.3  13.2 
Cultural and recreational services  5.0  23.4 
Note:  (a) Calculated inclusive of imported inputs, and with competing imports allocated indirectly.  
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